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The integrity of a trial rests on the jury’s ability to objectively and accurately evaluate 
the facts, yet a large body of research indicates jurors do not reason objectively. The Story 
Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1988) Explanatory Coherence (Thaggard, 1989) and Coherence-
Based Reasoning (Simon, 2004) were used as the theoretical basis for the current study. Using 
a 2*2*2 experimental design 257 participants, acting as mock-jurors read a criminal trial 
transcript and rated the evidence twice. Here we show that DNA presented early by the 
prosecution is associated with greater coherence-shifting. A recency effect was found for initial 
ratings of DNA evidence. This supports the literature that jurors do not reason objectively; 
however, the two cognitive effects appear to work in opposite directions, resulting in 
homogenous ratings of that same evidence by deliberation. DNA timing did not impact 
confidence ratings. Further, DNA did not inflate subsequent evidence, failing to replicate the 
recent assimilation hypothesis (Rassin, 2017). Pre-trial instruction was associated with better 
understanding of DNA evidence and lower ratings of prosecution DNA. Inconsistencies in 
findings indicate that the cognitive processes may be different for the prosecution and the 
defence. Limitations, including a lack of power, and implications the theoretical frameworks 
and the legal system are discussed. 
Keywords: coherence-shift; DNA evidence; juror reasoning; judicial instruction 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. The problem with DNA evidence 
Although perceived to be reliable and heralded as the ‘gold standard’ (Lieberman, Carrell 
Miethe, & Krauss, 2008), DNA is subjective due to inherent human perceptual elements guised 
in the form of numerical beliefs (Dror & Hampikian, 2011). It is highly prejudicial (Appleby 
& Kassin, 2016; Dartnall & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006) with up to 93% of people finding 
DNA the most persuasive evidence of guilt (Lieberman, et al., 2008).  
Judges and jurors are unable to identify faulty scientific testimony (McAuliff, Kovera & 
Nunez, 2009) resulting in untested and flawed DNA testimony being declared admissible 
(Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). The US National Academy of Science Report on Forensic Science 
highlighted the potential for faulty, untested forensic science to be given undue weight and 
result in wrongful convictions (Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward, 2009). Following this, the PCAST Report raised alarms by citing studies showing 
11% of microscopically “matched” hair samples came from different sources and that in 3,000 
cases involving microscopic hair analysis, 95% contained invalid testimony inculpating the 
defendant (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2016). 
An individual’s guilt or innocence should be evaluated objectively on the facts. Yet despite 
the fallibility of DNA evidence, jurors demonstrate a poor ability to accurately evaluate DNA 
evidence by overweighting (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988; Lieberman et al., 2008) and 
underweighting DNA evidence (Nance & Morris, 2005). Further, its statistical expression 
provides ripe conditions for heuristic and fallacious reasoning, including; ‘the prosecutors 
fallacy’, ‘the defence-attorney’s fallacy’ and ‘the weak evidence effect’ (Thompson 1987; 
McQuiston-Surrett, & Saks, 2009; Martire, Kemp, Sayle, & Newell, 2014).   
This potential threat to the justice system cannot be understated or limited to the United 
States jurisdiction; 71 wrongful convictions have been identified in Australia between 1922-
 11 
2015 (Dioso-Villa, 2015). This thesis explores how prejudice may arise simply by virtue of the 
order of DNA presentation, and how pre-trial instructions may be more effective than post-trial 
instructions at combating fallacious reasoning. 
1.2. Not what you say, but when you say it? 
Jurors receive evidence piece by piece over time. The following frameworks (see Figure 1) 
will set the foundation for investigating the effect of receiving DNA evidence at different time 
points on assignments of probative weight. Further, alongside empirical support, these 
frameworks will form the basis for examining if pre-trial instruction can mitigate prejudice 
more than post-trial instruction.  
The literature has yet to unify one theory of juror reasoning, despite many of the theoretical 
frameworks being compatible (Byrne, 1995). Combined, the Story Model (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1986; 1988; 1992; 1993), Explanatory Coherence (Thaggard, 1989; 2005) and 
Coherence-Based Reasoning (Simon, 2004) provide a cohesive framework, unaccounted for 
by heuristics alone. They posit that evidence does not exist in isolation but interacts with 
surrounding evidence and results in distorted judgements that do not align with optimal 
judgements as defined by theories of rationality (Plous, 1993). 
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Figure 1.Conceptualization of the theoretical frameworks in the current study 
The Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; 1988; 1992; 1993) 
Predecisional Information Distortion (Carlson & Russo, 2001; Blanchard, Carlson & Meloy, 2014) 




Explanatory coherence. Explanatory coherence posits that the acceptability of a verdict 
depends on the ‘set of propositions’ it belongs with. Propositions depends on the elements 
around them and if the elements do not explain a proposition - overall skepticism is increased 
(Thaggard, 1989). Reasoning is bidirectional (known in explanatory coherence as ‘symmetry’), 
meaning evidence impacts verdict and verdict impacts evidence. One verdict needs more facts 
supporting it to be ‘activated’ (receiving reciprocal support) at a certain level (beyond 
reasonable doubt) than the non-chosen verdict (Thaggard, 1989). Facts with no support 
‘degrade’.  
This ‘degrading’ of facts without support is echoed by empirical research. Knowledge that 
a cause was involved in an event has been shown to trigger confirmatory search strategies 
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982). In addition, focusing on single explanations causes competing 
explanations to reduce credibility as the alternative explanation inhibits construction of other 
explanations and triggers a confirmatory search for information (Sloman, 1994). Given that in 
a criminal trial, propositions are often not mutually exclusive (i.e. defendant may be at the 
scene, but did not commit the crime), this inhibition of other explanations would be concerning.  
Given this, there are two pathways of assessment for testimony by explanatory coherence 
(see Figure 2) (Thaggard, 2005). This framework supports that DNA evidence may be more 
readily accepted as ‘consistent’ when presented earlier in the trial, as competing explanations 



































The Story Matters. The Story Model posits that jurors chose between competing stories 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1986; 1988; 1992; 1993). Pennington and Hastie (1988) highlighted the 
importance of the order of evidence presentation; when the prosecution presented their case in 
story-order, compared to the defence presenting in witness-order, 78% of participants returned 
a guilty verdict. When this was reversed (prosecution items in witness-order; defence items in 
story-order) the conviction rate among participants dropped to 31%. This indicates that it is not 
so much what is presented at trial, but how it is presented.  
Aligning with explanatory coherence and coherence-based reasoning, the Story Model 
theorizes that ‘explanatory representations’ form a guiding structure for evidence integration 
which determines the ultimate verdict.  The probative implications for verdict cannot be 
evaluated alone and are dependent on the interrelatedness of other evidence (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993). ‘Coverage’ refers to how much of the evidence is explained by the story and 
‘coherence’ is the degree to which the story is not contradictory. The more coherent a story, the 
more plausible and the more the plausible, the higher the confidence.  
Finally, there is a body of research under the predecisional information distortion 
framework supporting that preexisting preferences lead to distortions of new information in 
favour of the initial preference (Blanchard, Carlson, & Meloy, 2014; Carlson & Russo, 2001; 
Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996). Pretrial bias has been found to predict verdict, supporting 
distortion of facts (Estrada-Reynolds, Gray, & Nunez, 2015) 
Therefore, inculpating DNA evidence when presented at the beginning of a trial may trigger 
one story representation to take the lead, and subsequent evidence to be considered in 
comparison, making it more prejudicial than DNA presented at the end. 
Coherence-based reasoning (CBR).i  CBR is theoretically founded in explanatory 




Glöckner & Engel, 2013; Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 2010; Holyoak & Simon 1999; 
Simon, Pham, Le, & Holyoak, 2001). 
CBR begins with ‘mental representations of a trial,’ forming a multi-directional scaffold of 
possible connections (Simon, 2004). Empirical evidence demonstrates that reasoning is 
bidirectional, (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Lundberg, 2004) subconscious, 
precedes the decision, and that coherence-shifts occur (Simon, Snow & Read, 2004; Simon, 
2004).  
Coherence-shifts have proven to be very robust in the literature (Lundberg, 2004; 2011; 
Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2001; Simon, 2004). They refer to the process where 
facts with no support from the scaffold degrade and those with bidirectional support become 
stronger as they aid coherence. This process polarizes the evidence, resulting in a twisted 
representation where facts no longer reflect their actual probative weight as they have been 
transformed to aid coherence. Initial leanings to convict have shown stronger coherence than 
initial acquit leanings (Charman, Gregory, & Carlucci, 2009). This is particularly concerning 
when DNA forms part of a circumstantial case, as coherence-shifts may enable DNA to ‘cinch’ 
a verdict and trigger a ‘spreading coherence’. This may impact memory recall by inhibiting 
alternative explanations, causing the threshold of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ to be reached 
(Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004).  
Outside the mock-juror setting, empirical research indicates only a developing preference 
is needed for this distortion to emerge (Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996). Committing to a 
verdict is a driver of distortion (Polman & Russo, 2012) and sequential presentation of 
information is a driver of commitment (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001). Blanchard, 
Carlson, and Guha (2011) have shown that not only is the preferred decision over weighted 
(proleader distortion), but the alternative decision is pushed down (antitrailer distortion). This 




begin to emerge before the trial even begins, particularly in the case of exposure to negative 
trial media (Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004). 
Methodological limitations with CBR in the literature. Backed by the transient 
nature of coherence-shifts, the literature to date has used a ‘stepwise evolution’ type design, 
whereby participants’ ratings of evidence are measured at pre-test, leaning and post-test. In the 
pre-test ‘seemingly unrelated’ vignettes have been used as the dependent measure whereby this 
vignette is incorporated into the trial stimulus and rated again (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 
2004; Greenspan & Scurich, 2016). This assumes that the transient nature of coherence-shifts 
will remove any priming effects. Further, the vignettes may produce an increase in accessibility 
of arguments which are consistent with the anchor. Anchoring effects are robust (Furnham & 
Boo, 2011) and have been found even in legal experts (e.g. judges) using subtle manipulations, 
where defence sentencing recommendations assimilate towards those made by the prosecution 
(Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006). Therefore, although the literature has placed a time 
delay (of 2-3 weeks) between the two ratings and has successfully replicated coherence-shifts, 
this thesis will not use pre-test vignettes. Instead, it will examine the ratings during the trial as 
evidence arises, and then again before rendering a verdict to see if coherence-shifts are 
replicated within a trial and if they are greater for those who receive DNA evidence first.  
Some studies allocated participants to one side or as arbitrators or changed facts of the 
stimulus materials to be either exculpating or inculpating to prompt context effects. For 
example, Holyoak and Simon (1999) changed evidence about the defendant’s character to 
successfully prompt coherence-shifts and Greenspan and Scurich (2016) changed the strength 
of confession evidence. Fawcett (2016) studied the effects of an “ambush” alibi, finding that 
when the alibi is given later in trial to ambush the other party, it is perceived as less credible. 
These studies are not generalisable to the current study given that changing evidence adds 




was lying, whereas DNA evidence being introduced to the trial at different times does not add 
additional inferences. Additionally, jurors are never explicitly instructed to favour a particular 
side.  Finally, although these studies have stimulated coherence-shifts they have not examined 
how the temporal process of information itself may influence coherence-shifts. 
Constabile and Klein (2010) found support for recency effects, but analysis indicated that 
memory recall was a strong mediator for this effect. Furnham (1986) changed the order of 
defence and prosecution arguments and found recency effects whereby when the prosecution 
presented last, there was an increase in convictions, but this is not ecologically valid as it is 
enshrined in statute that the prosecution must set out their case first. Two studies examined the 
order effects of alibi and eyewitness identification and found the last piece of evidence had 
greater impact on assessment of guilt (Dahl, Brimacombe, & Lindsay, 2009; Price & Dahl, 
2013). However, both of these studies were in the context of a mock-police investigation, not 
a mock-juror setting. Also, the evidence presented either strongly implicated or exculpated the 
defendant, making the effects hard to unwind in terms of potential contrast effects. Charman, 
Carbone, Kekessie, and Villalba (2016) corrected this by examining whether ambiguous 
evidence could retrospectively change the evaluation of previous evidence and considered 
rumination and order effects as mediators. While rumination had no effect on verdict, they did 
observe recency effects. However, probability of guilt and dichotomous verdict were used as 
the dependent measure to distinguish evaluation from integration.  
The current study improves the methodology employed above by taking a second rating of 
the manipulated evidence as a dependent measure compared to probability of guilt and verdict. 
Therefore, the impact on DNA evidence at different time points can be distinguished from 
global assessments of guilt.  
Davis, Tindale, Nagao, Hinsz, and Robertson (1984) examined order effects on 




damage to property. Participants received the information in different orders with criminal 
damage to property remaining in the middle. Therefore, it was either preceded by a more 
serious or less serious charge. Conviction of earlier charges inflated later conviction. This 
was explained by the contrast between charges, but the results could also be explained under 
CBR where prejudicial evidence given early has more impact. This finding would also be 
compatible with primacy effects postulated by Pennington and Hastie (1982).  
Finally, the assimilation hypothesis has recently received empirical support in a study 
demonstrating initial knowledge of DNA evidence inflates subsequent evidence (Rassin, 
2017). However, the stimulus materials used only comprised short vignettes of evidence and 
lack ecological validity. This is consistent with the finding that confession evidence inflates 
ratings of handwriting evidence (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014).  
Therefore, CBR supports that early presentation of strong inculpating evidence may initiate 
beliefs of guilt, and trigger spreading coherence. Ambiguous evidence may be bolstered to 
cohere with early beliefs. Further, all subsequent evidence will be compared to the evidence 
which entered the mental representation early on. If this early evidence is strong, it may afford 
‘relevance’ to facts supporting it thereby inhibiting other explanations. This fits with 
explanatory coherence as discussed under 1.1.  
Confidence. Confidence in verdict is often unrelated to the accuracy of DNA knowledge 
or comprehension (Goodman-Delahunty & Hewson, 2010). Studies have found proleader and 
antitrailer distortion increased confidence regardless of verdict (Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004). 
The Story Model postulates the fit between story and verdict determines confidence. Therefore, 
if one story has been bolstered it will fit better with that verdict category. 
Debiasing attempts. In the mock-juror setting, explicitly warning people upfront about the 
‘continued influence effect’ concerning inadmissible evidence has reduced juror reliance on 




disconfirmation mitigates coherence-shifts (Simon, 2004) has been withdrawn (Simon, 2012). 
No effective way to debias coherence-shifts in the juror realm have been successful.  
Attempts to debias coherence-shifts outside the mock-juror setting have had mixed results. 
Raising expectations of accountability in front of others has been found to enhance integrative 
thinking and debias facts (Anderson & Sechler, 1986; Colombo, 2018). Delaying the formation 
of an emerging conclusion (Charman, 2013), and consideration of ‘component lists’ prior to 
choice, has mitigated coherence-shifting and over-confidence (Carlson & Pearo, 2004). Studies 
using hypothesis disconfirmation have been mostly unsuccessful with some eliciting a 
detrimental response (Colombo, 2018; Walmsley & Gilbey, 2017). 
1.3. The problem with judicial instructions – a little too late? 
Instructions are typically given post-trial. They are directions from the judge to the jury 
about how the jury should evaluate a case according to the law. Instructions aim to ensure jurors 
do not reason in a prejudicial way and will always be given when DNA forms part of a 
circumstantial case. The judiciary’s faith in instructions as gate-keeping mechanisms capable 
of mitigating the prejudice of DNA was reaffirmed by the majority in the High Court case of 
Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15 (Heydon J). 
Yet, psychological research has long indicated that post-trial instructions are ineffective 
(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Ogloff & Rose, 2005) even when aimed at combating misleading 
testimony (McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009) or target comprehension of DNA (Dartnall & 
Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). One study cited negligible difference between a group receiving 
no instruction and a post-trial instruction (63% and 59% conviction rate respectively) compared 
to pre-trial instruction (37% conviction rate) (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979).  Even judicial 
instruction clearly stating the prosecution expert was unjustified did not impact verdict, and 




(Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015). Further, jurors report confidence where objective ability to 
follow instructions is inadequate (Ogloff & Rose, 2005).  
In contrast, pre-trial instructions significantly improve juror’s ability to remember and 
distinguish probative from non-probative evidence (ForsterLee, Horowitz, & Bourgeois, 
1993), by helping to provide jurors with a legally appropriate scaffold to evaluate and integrate 
evidence throughout the trial. Trabasso and Sperry (1985) examined importance of story 
events, finding that if an event was in the causal chain from the beginning of the story until the 
end it was a predictor of judgement of importance. This fits with the Story Model as story 
structure provide an ‘index’ for the importance of different pieces of evidence (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993). Pre-trial instruction can set the story structure according to the law and not 
jurors’ preconceived notions, potentially improving juror evaluation of cases.  
 Pre-trial instructions also improve juror’s ability to apply the law to the facts even while 
simultaneously using “exemplars” of crime in their evaluation and reduce prejudice against the 
defendant’s characteristics (Smith, 1991; Heuer & Penrod, 1989). Studies showing no effect 
on ‘quality of verdict’, (Smith, 1991) may be due to the fact that assessing jurors’ verdicts as 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ objectively is hard and requires methodological changes to do so (ForsterLee, 
Horowitz & Bourgeois, 1993), which has been neglected for the most part in the literature. 
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1977) found moderate improvement in memory recall of probative 
evidence when instruction was given pre and post-trial. Other studies, despite stating ‘trends 
towards significance’ do not provide significant statistical support for the effectiveness of pre-
trial instruction on improving assessments of probative weight (Wheatcroft & Keogan, 2017; 
Rowe, 1997). Although Rowe (1997) did not find a significant effect for participants given an 
instruction, the study was underpowered. Further, Wheatcroft and Keogan’s (2017) instruction 
only consisted of a verbal warning by the researcher to “be aware of the danger of placing 




of it”. This takes away the cloak (i.e. the judge) which an instruction typically wears and may 
have a different impact than if the instruction is embodied as part of the trial stimulus materials.  
Some studies have explained the failure of instruction to have an impact in terms of 
increased cognitive load (Wheatcroft & Keogan, 2017) but this seems overly simplistic. The 
trial process itself is cognitively demanding, and it does not explain the failure of even simple 
instructions to have an effect, nor the success of pre-trial instruction. Others have speculated 
that jurors perceive a lack of ‘specialty’ on behalf of the judge (Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015). 
A large portion of the literature has suggested post-trial instructions inhibit memory of trial 
facts compared to pre-instructed/non-instructed jurors (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979), but these 
results are mixed, with some finding no difference in recall between groups (Hastie, Penrod, & 
Pennington, 1983; Elwork, Sales & Alfini, 1977; Heuer & Penrod, 1989).  
Elwork et al., (1977) suggested that pre-trial instruction attuned jurors to probative pieces 
of evidence and found pre-instructed jurors were more likely to remember evidence in favour 
of the defence. Others have suggested that pre-trial instruction raises skepticism from the 
outset, changing the evaluation of evidence (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). This idea of 
increased skepticism fits with the theory of explanatory coherence (Thaggard, 1989). Increased 
skepticism triggered by pre-trial instruction would also act to delay commitment to a decision 
– a driver of distortion in the literature – and enable better evaluation of DNA evidence (Smith, 
1991; Polman & Russo, 2012).  
However, studies examining instructions have not tracked the ratings of evidence so there 
is no way to know if post-trial instruction inhibits memory, or if jurors are not attuned to legally 
relevant facts, or if that information is simply disregarded/downgraded at the time of evaluation 




It is likely jurors are unable to re-evaluate polarized evidence retrospectively when post-
trial instruction is given, as at this point they enter into story classification (Pennington & 
Hastie, 1993). 
Studies have focused on simplifying instructions to increase comprehension (Baguley, 
McKimmie, & Masser, 2017; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977), instruction on standards of proof, 
right to silence, witness reliability and other specifics about applying law to the facts, but this 
is wasted if the instruction is delivered too late. Previously the effect of instruction on verdict 
has been the focus; in contrast, this thesis will focus on the weight attributed to the DNA 
evidence.  
Finally, this study will include a manipulation check with the instruction, as it is not clear 
from past studies if manipulation checks directly targeting the instruction have been included 
(Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). 
1.4. The current study. 
Research should aim to help jurors objectively evaluate trial facts. Distinguishing probative 
from non-probative facts and appropriate attribution of weight to evidence is central to a fair 
trial. Therefore, this study will focus on the weightings of DNA evidence and its impact on the 
surrounding evidence. If jurors are influenced by temporal effects, it is important to ensure one 
side is not prejudiced by virtue of presentation order. Prejudicial evidence (like DNA) could 
be presented at a later point in the trial, which may enable more accurate assignments of 
probative weight. 
Finally, debiasing attempts by opposing expert testimony and cross-examination have had 
mixed success. If effective, pre-trial instruction has the capacity to be easily adopted (Heuer & 






Table 1  
Aims and hypothesis  
Research questions Hypotheses 
One: What effect does 
timing of DNA evidence in a 
criminal trial have on mock-
juror evaluation of evidence? 
1. DNA given at the beginning will be attributed more 
weight and will gain further weight throughout the trial 
than DNA given at the end of the trial. 
2. DNA evidence at the beginning of the trial will 
inflate subsequent evidence. 
3. Participants will be more confident in their 
decision when the DNA is presented at the beginning of 
the trial. 
Two: Can a judicial 
instruction given earlier in the 
trial mitigate coherence-shifts 
better than a judicial 
instruction given at the end of 
the trial? 
4. When the judicial instruction is given at the 
beginning of the trial, there will be less coherence-
shifting, and the DNA will not be weighted as favourably 
as when the judicial instruction is given at the end of the 
trial. 
Aims one and two 5. Participants in the condition where the DNA is 
presented first, and the judicial instruction is presented 
last, will be more likely to vote guilty. 











 Chapter 2: Method 
2.1 Ethics  
The study was approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics 
Subcommittee, approval number 18/16 (Appendix A). Participation was voluntary and 
anonymous. Informed consent was obtained from participants prior to their commencement in 
the study, indicated by ticking ‘yes’ at the bottom of the information preamble page (Appendix 
D). Identification numbers used for students participating in exchange for course credit assured 
anonymity. Participants were informed that their data would be made available on the Open 
Science Framework in a de-identified, quantitative form. 
2.2 Participants 
A total of N = 257 participants completed the study, after 50 responses were removed for 
failing manipulation checks. A recent study has provided support for the use of student 
populations in mock-juror research (Bornstein et al., 2017). Therefore, level one psychology 
students at the University of Adelaide (N=99) were recruited via the Research Participation 
Pool and completed the study in exchange for course credit. The study also comprised members 
of the public recruited by posters on the University of Adelaide campus and word of mouth. 
Members of the public were able to go in the draw to win 1 of 3 $50 David Jones vouchers in 
exchange for their participation. All participants were current Australian residents. 
This study did not conform to the eligibility criteria for jurors in SA (set out in the Juries 
Act 1927). 2 participants were aged under the age of 18. 2 participants were aged 70 or over. 
Only 2 participants (law clerk + judicial assistant) identified an occupation within the legal 
practice excluded under the Juries Act 1927. Participants were not screened for past criminal 
convictions. If participants completed the survey and passed all manipulation checks it was 




This inclusion criteria were due to the time and resource constrains on the study. Further, 
while some studies indicate judges are more conservative in their reasoning (McQuiston-
Surrett & Saks, 2009), research indicates judges and lawyers fall prey to the same types of 
fallacious reasoning as lay people (Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrick, 2001).  
An a priori power analysis indicated 84 participants were needed to obtain 80% power and 
a medium effect size of .3 at an alpha level of .05. Given the mixed results in the literature, 
different methodology in the current study and unknown effect size, the study aimed for 30 
participants in each group (n = 240 total). 
2.3 Materials 
The study was completed online via Survey Monkey™. Participants first opened a survey 
which then randomly assigned them to 1 of 8 experimental conditions (see Appendix C). The 
study survey consisted of a transcript written by the researcher (see Appendix E) of 
approximately 5,000 words. The stimulus materials used are available on the Open Science 
Framework. The facts of the transcript (titled Bayar v The Queen for the purposes of the 
experiment) were taken from the Australian case of Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15. 
Certain facts were omitted/changed to fit the time limitations of the study. A criminal case was 
chosen for this study, as it is typically criminal cases where juries are employed in Australia. A 
10-point Likert scale was used to rate the evidence at both time points. A Likert scale was used 
as it has been rated as easy to use by participants, has acceptable validity and reliability, and is 
consistent with previous literature (Preston & Colman, 2000; Holyoak & Simon, 1999).  
Dependent measures included ratings of all evidence at two time points, dichotomous 
verdict, probability of guilt (0-100) and confidence on a 10-point Likert scale. In addition, a 
multiple-choice question assessed participants understanding of the DNA evidence 
(specifically we were interested to see if the judicial instruction had been effective in combating 




invited to make optional comments about their reasoning at the end of the study. There were 
four manipulation checks with the study; one accompanied the judicial instruction and another 
three questions concerning the beginning, middle and end of the trial. 
2.4 Procedure 
Participants accessed the study via a Survey Monkey™ web address and were randomly 
allocated to one of eight conditions, which then linked them to a second survey containing the 
study.  
Participants read the participant preamble and gave informed consent. Participants were 
blinded and did not know the purpose of the study; rather they were informed broadly that it 
was aimed to assess the ways in which jurors decide during a complex trial. Participants first 
answered demographic questions, including age, gender, occupation and educational history 
before reading the transcript. The stimulus materials were organized so each piece of evidence 
was considered and rated separately. Throughout the transcript participants rated each piece of 
evidence on a 10-point Likert scale from -5 (highly indicative of innocence) to +5 (highly 
indicative of guilt). There were four manipulation checks imbedded in the study. The questions 
were multiple-choice and concerned the beginning, middle and end of the transcript. A further 
manipulation check was included with the judicial instruction to ensure participants active 
engagement with the instruction; where participants were asked to list three reasons why DNA 
may not indicate guilt. Participants then re-rated the same pieces of evidence on the same scale 
before rendering a dichotomous verdict, rating their confidence in their decision and giving a 
probability of guilt. A final optional question invited participants to write something about their 
reasoning. 
Participants had the option to receive a summary statement at the culmination of data 
collection, provided that an email address had been supplied (see Appendix H) and to go in the 




Design statement. This study used a between subjects experimental 2 (pre-trial and post-
trial instruction) * 2 (prosecution DNA beginning/end of prosecution case) *2 (defence DNA 
beginning/end of defence case) design. The resulting experimental conditions are outlined in 
Figure 3 below.  
There is no control, as all comparisons are made between groups. This is justified as the 
design considers important ecological and external validity points. Firstly, a judge always 
instructs a jury on DNA evidence and the focus of the current study is the difference between 
pre vs. post-trial instruction. Therefore, a condition where participants are not instructed would 
be inapplicable. Secondly, DNA evidence is central to the research question, concerning the 
temporal effect of the DNA, not the effect of DNA itself. Therefore, the research questions and 
hypotheses do not require a baseline as it would be unsurprising to find a lower conviction rate 








Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Data screening and quality control 
The experiment was conducted online, and it was necessary to ensure participants engaged 
with the materials. As outlined in Chapter 2, four manipulation checks were used. On 
inspection of the data, it was apparent that despite engaging with the task (evidenced by 
participants’ open-ended response) 19 participants failed only the first multiple-choice 
manipulation (see question in Appendix E). This question asked participants to distinguish 
between the statistical expression of the DNA match given by the prosecution and the defence.  
Participants struggled to understand/discern between the two opposing expert testimonies 
despite engaging with the task. We decided to follow through with a strict exclusion criterion 
as stipulated in pre-registration. Exclusion of this data also ensures that any effect in the data 
is not due to misunderstanding of DNA evidence. 257 respondents remained after a further 31 
responses were excluded due to attrition and failing manipulation checks. 
3.2. A priori comparisons  
A priori comparisons were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to data 
collection; however, their use was dependent upon the data being normally distributed. The 
coherence-shift statistic was calculated by taking the difference between the two ratings 
(second rating before rendering a verdict – initial rating of the evidence) to give a change score 
for the two pieces of DNA evidence. A negative score on coherence-shift means that the 
participants’ rating shifted to favour the defence, and a positive change score means that the 
participants’ rating shifted to favour the prosecution. A score of 0 means that the rating did not 
change. 
Hypothesis 1.   This hypothesis predicted that DNA given at the beginning would be 
attributed more weight and would gain further weight throughout the trial than DNA given at 




Histograms and QQ plots confirmed that the data was not normal, but homogeneity of 
variance was acceptable (see Appendix F). Therefore, we used non-parametric tests to carry 
out a priori comparisons. As hypotheses are directional, the one-tailed exact statistic is 
reported.  
Initial ratings of prosecution DNA evidence 
The hypothesis that DNA given at the beginning would be attributed more weight was 
unsupported. Group 2 (Mdn=37.78) who received the DNA last had significantly higher ratings 
than Group 3 (Mdn=28.95), receiving the DNA first Z=-1.932, p=.027.  Likewise, Group 8 
(Mdn=38.18) who received the DNA evidence last had significantly higher ratings than Group 
6 (Mdn=27.32), receiving DNA evidence first, Z=-2.410, p=.008. Group 7 (Mdn=38.45), also 
received the DNA last and had higher ratings than Group 5 (Mdn=26.91), Z=-2.605, p=.004. 
There was no significant difference between Group 1 (Mdn=30.93) and Group 4 (Mdn=32.20), 
Z=-.297, p=.386. 
A boxplot in Figure 4 gives a visual illustration of the initial rating across groups confirming 
the trend for those groups receiving the prosecution DNA evidence last (indicated by ‘P2’) to 













Figure 4. Boxplot showing initial rating of prosecution DNA evidence across conditions.  













Coherence-shift of prosecution DNA evidence 
The hypothesis that DNA given at the beginning would gain more weight throughout the 
trial than DNA given last was partially supported. As predicted Group 1 (Mdn=36.28) who 
received the DNA first had a greater coherence-shift than Group 4 (Mdn=25.70), Z=-2.464, 
p=.007. Similarly, Group 6 (Mdn=37.35) - who received the DNA first - shifted more than 
Group 8 (Mdn=29.03) who received the DNA last, Z=-1.892, p=.029 and Group 5 
(Mdn=37.88) – who received the DNA first - had a greater shift than Group 7 (Mdn=26.77) 
receiving the DNA last, Z=-2.463, p=.007. There was no difference between Group 2 
(Mdn=36.44) and Group 3 (Mdn=30.28), Z=-1.356, p=.089. Therefore, these results provide 
partial support for the Hypothesis 1 that DNA given earlier in the trial would shift more in 




























Initial ratings of defence DNA evidence 
 It was predicted that the DNA evidence would be attributed more probative weight; 
therefore, the measure in context of the defence DNA, means lower ratings were more 
probative as they shifted towards “highly indicative of innocence.” Comparisons on initial 
ratings of defence DNA did not support Hypothesis 1.   
Group 2 (Mdn= 27.12) - who received the DNA last - rated the DNA evidence more 
persuasive than Group 4 receiving it first (Mdn=36.82), Z=-2.136, p=.016. Similarly, Group 8 
(Mdn=28.94), receiving the DNA second rated it higher than Group 7 (Mdn=37.45) receiving 
the DNA first, Z=-1.856, p=.032. There was no significant difference between Group 5 
(Mdn=31.15) and Group 6 (Mdn=33.94), Z=-.611, p=.27 or Group 1 (Mdn=35.24) and Group 
3 (Mdn=31.66) Z=-.776, p=.222. The boxplot below illustrates the trend for DNA evidence 
given last to be rated more highly. 
























Coherence-shift of defence DNA evidence 
It was predicted that early presentation of defence DNA would increase coherence-shift. 
This was not supported. There was no difference for comparisons on timing and coherence-
shift. There was no significant difference between Group 2 (Mdn=32.69) and Group 4 
(Mdn=30.05), Z=-.608, p=.274, Group 1 (Mdn=31.99) and Group 3 (Mdn=35.11), Z=-.698, 
p=.245, Group 5 (Mdn=31.55) and Group 6 (Mdn=33.73), Z=-.524, p=.303 or Group 7 
(Mdn=29.47) and Group 8 (Mdn=36.22), Z=-1.539, p=.063.  
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis that DNA evidence would inflate subsequent evidence was 
not supported. The data was not normally distributed however, homogeneity of variance was 
not violated (Appendix H). We used non-parametric tests to carry out a priori comparisons.  
Figure 6. Boxplot showing initial ratings of defence DNA across groups. 




Prosecution inflation of the “neighbour’s testimony” 
To examine the effect of prosecution DNA evidence, comparisons were made on the 
neighbor’s testimony, which was either the first piece of evidence if the DNA was presented 
last or the second piece of evidence if it followed DNA evidence. Comparisons showed no 
significant difference between ratings of testimony following or not following DNA. Results 
of the Mann Whitney U tests used compare conditions are presented in Table 2 below.  
Table 2  
A priori comparisons testing prosecution DNA inflation of subsequent evidence 
using Mann Whitney U tests 
 
Comparisoniii Groups compared “Neighbours testimony” ratings 
2 2(JI-P2-D2) 
3(JI-P1-D2) 












5(Mdn=33.21) and 7(Mdn=31.74) 
Z=-.416, p=.369 
Note. See Appendix E for full stimulus materials. * in Figure 3 Chapter 2 
indicates neighbours’ testimony. Bold font = manipulation compared. P1 = DNA 
first, proceeding neighbour’s testimony. P2 = DNA last, not proceeding 





Defence inflation of the “mechanics testimony” 
Comparisons were made on the mechanics testimony, which was the first piece of evidence 
presented by the defence, or the second piece of evidence following the DNA. Comparisons 
showed no significant difference between ratings of mechanics testimony following or not 
following defence DNA. Results of Mann Whiney U tests are presented in Table 3 below.  
Table 3 
A priori comparisons testing defence DNA inflation of subsequent evidence using 
Mann Whitney U 
Comparison Groups compared “Neighbours testimony” ratings 




















Note. Bold font = manipulation. D1 = DNA first, proceeding mechanics 




Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis predicted that pre-trial instruction would reduce coherence-
shifting and lower initial ratings of DNA evidence compared to groups receiving post-trial 
instruction. The different aspects of the hypothesis are considered in turn below. 
Initial ratings of prosecution DNA  
Comparisons on initial ratings for prosecution DNA evidence and pre-trial vs. post-trial 
instruction provided partial support for Hypothesis 3. Group 1 (Mdn=30.09) – who received a 
pre-trial instruction - had lower ratings than Group 5 (Mdn=38.03), Z=-1.769, p=.039. Group 
4 (Mdn=20.88) with pre-trial instruction also had lower ratings than comparison Group 7 
(Mdn=38.24), Z=-4.088, p=.000. Despite this, there was no significant difference between 
Group 2 (Mdn=32.79), and Group 8 (Mdn=36.21), Z=-.742, p=.231 or Group 3 (Mdn=30.75) 
and Group 6 (Mdn=33.29), Z=-.573, p=.287. Figure 5 mentioned above under Hypothesis 1 
shows the shift in initial ratings across conditions. 
Initial ratings of defence DNA  
There was no significant difference for pre vs. post-trial instruction on initial ratings of 





A priori comparisons for the effect of pre vs. post-trial instruction on initial ratings of DNA evidence using Mann Whitney U tests 
Comparison Groups compared Initial ratings 
Defence Prosecution 
9 1 (JI-PE1-DE1) 
5* (PE1-DE1-JI) 
1(Mdn=34.56) and 5(Mdn=33.42) 
Z=-.245, p=.405 
1(Mdn=30.09) and 5(Mdn=38.03) 
Z=-1.769, p=.039 
10 2 (JI-PE2-DE2) 
8* (PE2-DE2-JI) 
2(Mdn=32.15) and 8(Mdn=36.85) 
Z=-1.000, p=.160 




3(Mdn=30.38) and 6(Mdn=33.68) 
Z=-.729, p=.235 
3(Mdn=30.75) and 6(Mdn=33.29) 
Z=-.573, p=.287 
12 4 (JI-PE2-DE1) 
7* (PE2-DE1-JI) 
4(Mdn=29.54) and 7(Mdn=30.42) 
Z=-.201, p=.423 
4(Mdn=20.88) and 7(Mdn=38.24) 
Z=-4.088, p=.000 
Note. * indicates the group receiving post-trial instruction, expected to have higher initial ratings. As outlined above, the measure in 




Prosecution DNA coherence-shift 
Comparisons on pre vs. post-trial instruction on coherence-shift for prosecution DNA did 
not provide support for Hypothesis 3. When the instruction was given pre-trial in Group 2 
(Mdn=39.76), ratings of the prosecution DNA shifted more than ratings in Group 8 (Mdn= 
29.24) receiving post-trial instruction, Z=-2.333, p=.010. Likewise, Group 4 (Mdn=33.84) who 
received the pre-trial instruction, shifted more than Group 7 (Mdn=26.53), Z=-1.701, p=.045. 
There was no significant difference between Group 1 (Mdn=36.99) and Group 5 (Mdn=30.92), 
Z=-1.345, p=.091 or between Group 3 (Mdn=29.92) and Group 6 (Mdn=34.15), Z=-.968, 
p=.169. These comparisons indicate a trend for pre-trial instruction to cause a greater 
coherence-shift. 
Defence DNA coherence-shift 
There were no significant differences in coherence-shift on the defence DNA evidence 





The effect of pre vs. post-trial instruction on coherence-shift of DNA evidence using Mann Whitney U tests 
Comparison Groups compared Coherence-shift on DNA 
Defence  Prosecution 
9 1 (JI-PE1-DE1) 
5* (PE1-DE1-JI) 
1(Mdn=31.38) and 5(Mdn=36.70) 
Z=-1.167, p=.124 
1(Mdn=36.99) and 5(Mdn=30.92) 
Z=-1.345, p=.091 
10 2 (JI-PE2-DE2) 
8* (PE2-DE2-JI) 
2(Mdn=33.31) and 8(Mdn=35.69) 
Z=-.537, p=.299 
2(Mdn=39.76) and 8(Mdn=29.24) 
Z=-2.333, p=.010 
11 3(JI-PE1-DE2) 
6 * (PE1-DE2-JI) 
3(Mdn=29.95) and 6(Mdn=34.11) 
Z=-.930, p=.178 
3(Mdn=29.92) and 6(Mdn=34.15) 
Z=-.968, p=.169 
12 4 (JI-PE2-DE1) 
7* (PE2-DE1-JI) 
4(Mdn=30.82) and 7(Mdn=29.26) 
Z=-.367, p=.360 
4(Mdn=33.84) and 7(Mdn=26.53) 
Z=-1.701, p=.045 





Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis that DNA evidence presented earlier in the trial would be 
associated with an increase in confidence was unsupported. The data was negatively skewed, 
but homogeneity of variance was not violated (Appendix H). Therefore, we used non-
parametric tests to carry out a priori comparisons. 
Group 8 (Mdn=37.24), received the defence DNA last and had higher confidence ratings 
than Group 7 (Mdn=28.35) and Z=-1.922, p=.027. There was no significant difference in other 
comparisons. They are presented in Table 6. 
Figure 7. Boxplot displaying confidence ratings in verdict across conditions. 





A priori comparisons using Mann-Whitney U tests for confidence ratings across conditions 
Comparison Groups compared Confidence rating 
1 2 (JI-P2-D2) (Mdn=33.53) 
4 (JI-P2-D1)* (Mdn=29.04) 
Z=-.995, p=.162 
2 2(JI-P2-D2) (Mdn=35.31) 
3(JI-P1-D2)* (Mdn=31.58) 
Z=-.798, p=.215 
3 1(JI-P1-D1)* (Mdn=31.90) 
4(JI-P2-D1) (Mdn=31.02) 
Z=-.196, p=.424 
4 1(JI-P1-D1)* (Mdn=33.85) 
3(JI-P1-D2) (Mdn=33.13) 
Z=-.156, p=.440 
5 7(P2-D1-JI)* (Mdn=28.35) 
8(P2-D2-JI) (Mdn=37.24) 
Z=-1.922, p=.027 
6 6(P1-D2-JI)* (Mdn=29.32) 
8(P2-D2-JI) (Mdn=36.35) 
Z=-1.527, p=.064 
7 5(P1-D1-JI)* (Mdn=35.45) 
7(P2-D1-JI) (Mdn=29.35) 
Z=-1.328, p=.093 
8 5(P1-D1-JI)* (Mdn=34.06) 
6(P1-D2-JI) (Mdn=30.84) 
Z=-.704, p=.243 
Note. P-values are reported using the Exact statistic one-tailed. * indicates the group 




Hypothesis 5.  This hypothesis predicted that post-trial instruction and early presentation 
of DNA evidence by the prosecution would result in the highest conviction rate. Distribution 
of verdicts are presented in Table 7. A chi-squared test of independence indicated the 
relationship between condition and verdict was significant, χ2 (7, N=257) = 14.46, p =.041. 
However, the hypothesis that the combination of early presentation of DNA evidence and post-
trial instruction (Group 6) would result in the most convictions was unsupported. The two 
groups with the highest conviction rate were Group 2 receiving both pieces of evidence last 
and a pre-trial instruction and Group 8 receiving both pieces of evidence last and a post-trial 
instruction.  
Table 7  
Distribution of verdict across condition   
Group Guilty Not guilty Average 
probability of 
guilt 
1(JI-P1-D1)  32% 68% 60 
2(JI-P2-D2) 44% 56% 63 
3(JI-P1-D2) 15% 85% 49 
4(JI-P2-D1) 14% 86% 52 
5(P1-D1-JI) 33% 67% 50 
6(P1-D2-JI) 32% 68% 65 
7(P2-D1-JI) 29% 71% 61 





3.3. Post-hoc exploratory analysis 
All exploratory analyses report the two-tailed statistic. 
Open-ended responses 
Open ended responses were deemed too unreliable for content analysis, given the variety 
and optional nature of responses.  
Range of probabilities associated with each verdict category  





Confidence post hoc-analysis 
Verdict was dummy coded to run a non-parametric test. Participants voting to convict 
(Mdn=166.01) were more confident that those voting to acquit (Mdn= 112.58), Z=-5.392, 
p=.000. Figure 9 below illustrates the distribution of confidence ratings by verdict. 
 






Table 8    
Cross tabulation between condition and response   
Group Both statements are equally 
likely to be true (both types of 
fallacious reasoning) 
Neither statements are 
likely to be true  
(correct) 
The first statement is 
most likely to be true 
(prosecutors’ fallacy) 
The second statement is most 
likely to be true (defence 
attorneys’ fallacy) 
1(JI-P1-D1)  17 (50%) 6 (18%) 7 (20%) 4 (12%) 
2(JI-P2-D2) 11 (32%) 8 (24%) 5 (15%) 10 (29%) 
3(JI-P1-D2) 8 (25%) 13 (41%) 8 (25%) 3 (9%) 
4(JI-P2-D1) 16 (57%) 6 (21%) 3 (11%) 3 (11%) 
5(P1-D1-JI) 11 (33%) 5 (15%) 4 (12%) 13 (39%) 
6(P1-D2-JI) 18 (58%) 2 (6%) 6 (19%) 5 (16%) 
7(P2-D1-JI) 15 (49%) 5 (16%) 5 (16%) 6 (19%) 
8(P2-D2-JI) 19 (56%) 5 (15%) 8 (24%) 2 (6%) 




Analysis on gender effects 
There were slight differences in the number of males and females across groups 
illustrated in Table 8. Given the materials included connotations to domestic violence gender 
differences were examined. However, there was no association between gender and verdict, 
χ2 (1, N=257) = .856, p =.399.  
 
Table 9    
Demographic information including, gender and age across conditions 
Group Female Male Age Number of 
participants 
1(JI-P1-D1)  56% 68% 30 34 
2(JI-P2-D2) 69% 56% 25 34 
3(JI-P1-D2) 59% 85% 33 32 
4(JI-P2-D1) 68% 86% 28 28 
5(P1-D1-JI) 64% 34% 33 33 
6(P1-D2-JI) 58% 42% 31 31 
7(P2-D1-JI) 64% 36% 31 31 
8(P2-D2-JI) 73% 27% 34 34 
Total 64% 54% 31 57 








Comparisons of secondary ratings pre-decision for DNA evidence  
There was largely no significant difference amongst comparisons for the second rating of 
either prosecution or defence DNA evidence. Only one comparison between Group 2 
(Mdn=39.12) and Group 3 (Mdn=27.52), indicated a significant difference, Z=-2.666, p=.008. 
The results of all comparisons are reported in Table 10 and 11 below.  
Figure 10 below shows ratings of prosecution DNA evidence before deliberation. Further, 
there was no difference between verdict and total coherence-shift (H (1) =1.129, p=.288), with 
a mean rank of 125.72 for not guilty, and 136.39 for guilty. A boxplot displays total coherence-



































Table 10    
Comparisons for second ratings of prosecution DNA evidence 




Group 2 (Mdn=39.12) 




Group 6 (Mdn=34.42) 





Group 5 (Mdn=31.19) 





Group 1 (Mdn=34.53) 
Group 4 (Mdn=27.82) 
Z=-1.562, p=.118 
 










Table 11    
Comparisons for second ratings of defence DNA evidence 




Group 7 (Mdn= 35.00) 




Group 5 (Mdn=30.67) 





Group 1 (Mdn=32.72) 





Group 2 (Mdn=28.49) 
Group 4 (Mdn=35.16) 
Z=-1.470, p=.144 
 




Chapter 4: Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
The aim of this study was to investigate timing effects on DNA evidence with the goal to 
help jurors make objective decisions. The results must be considered in light of the limitations 
discussed below, however, they suggest that recency effects and coherence-shifts work in 
opposite directions. This process appears to result in similar ratings of DNA by the end of the 
trial. The different findings may indicate different cognitive processes for both evaluation and 
integration and for prosecution and the defence. 
DNA evidence 
DNA evidence presented at the end of the trial was rated more highly, yet DNA evidence 
presented at the beginning was associated with greater coherence-shifting for the prosecution. 
DNA evidence did not inflate subsequent evidence or cause an increase in confidence when 
presented early. 
Judicial instruction 
Pre-trial instruction was associated with lower initial ratings for prosecution DNA, yet 
greater coherence-shifts. Pre-trial instruction did not impact defence DNA and was associated 
with increased understanding of DNA evidence.  
4.2 What effect does timing of DNA evidence in a criminal trial have on mock-juror 
evaluation of evidence? 
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported as DNA presented first was associated with greater 
coherence-shifts. This confirms the literature indicating that strong inculpating evidence 
triggers coherence-shifts (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Greenspan & Scurich, 2016). 
In opposition, both prosecution and defence initial ratings were higher when DNA was 
presented last. This supports the recency effects found by Constabile and Klein (2010) and 




Although contradictory, the results are compatible with CBR. As belief builds during a trial, 
evidence given last, may enter a set of propositions that provide a supporting framework for 
acceptability (Thaggard, 1989; 2005). The results indicate this causes higher ratings of DNA 
compared to when that same evidence enters the representation early in the trial. The increased 
coherence-shift for early presentation of prosecution DNA supports the bidirectional nature of 
reasoning in previous studies (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004; Lundberg, 2004). 
Overall, the contradictory effects may by symptomatic of evaluation and integration being 
separate cognitive processes as has been alluded to by Charman et al (2013).  
The defence DNA was less impacted by recency effects, and not impacted by the 
coherence-shifts at all. These inconsistencies may signal increasing constraint on the 
representation explained by CBR and Explanatory Coherence (Thaggard, 1989; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Glöckner & Engel, 2013; Glöckner, Betsch & 
Schindler, 2010). As the trial progresses, the mental representations become increasingly fixed 
by the prosecution case. Therefore, in contrast the prosecution may allow for more coherence-
shifting compared to the defence who must put forth their case in light of what the prosecution 
has presented.  
Due to a lack of similar studies and unknown effect size, it cannot be ascertained if the 
frameworks explain these inconsistencies across the prosecution and defence, or if they 
indicate a lack of power. 
4.3 Can a pre-trial instruction mitigate coherence-shifts better than a post-trial instruction? 
Mixed results provide partial support for Hypothesis 4. Pre-trial instruction was 
associated with lower initial ratings of prosecution DNA and increased understanding of DNA 
evidence. The latter indicates pre-trial instruction is more effective at combating the 
prosecutor’s fallacy (Thompson, 1989) and provides an explanation for participants lowered 




14-15%. This indicates support for the effectiveness of pre-trial instruction found in previous 
studies (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; ForsterLee, Horowitz & Bourgeois, 1993; Elwork, Sales, 
& Alfini, 1977). It is also consistent with the proposition that pre-trial instruction provides a 
legally appropriate index for jurors to evaluate and integrate evidence throughout the trial 
(Pennington & Hastie, 1993). The low rates of DNA comprehension (especially Group 6 with 
only 6% of participants correctly understanding DNA) indicate participants in post-trial 
conditions struggled to retrospectively correct their initial understandings. 
However, inconsistencies, particularly Group 2 (44% conviction rate) who received pre-
trial instruction did not conform to this trend. Two comparisons did not reach significance for 
pre-trial instruction reducing initial ratings of prosecution DNA evidence, which is in line with 
other studies which failed to find a significant effect (Wheatcroft & Keogan, 2017; Rowe, 
1997). This further indicates that the current study is underpowered despite having 257 
respondents.  
Further, pre vs. post-trial instruction had no significant effect on initial ratings of defence 
DNA. As discussed under 4.1 above, this may be due to the institutional structure of a trial. 
Although Charman et al (2016) found rumination had no impact on verdict, proximity of the 
prosecution case to the pre-trial instruction may be a mediating factor for its effectiveness. This 
would explain the lack of difference on the side of the defence in the current study. 
Pre-trial instruction was associated with an increased coherence-shift for two comparisons 
of prosecution DNA, yet the manipulation had no significant effects for the defence. The 
increasing constraint on the network may explain this. Further, although shifting more, 
examination of the distribution (see Figure 5) indicates that coherence-shift scores fell around 
0 (0 = no coherence-shift), with post-trial instructed groups more likely to shift towards the 
defence. Therefore, a likely explanation is that the lowered initial ratings with pre-trial 




Finally, there was largely no significant difference on second ratings of DNA. Given the 
mixed results and indication that timing effects of DNA mediate one another, the timing 
manipulations alone cannot be attributed as the only cause for the discrepant conviction rates. 
However, examination of Figure 10 indicates the distribution of pre-instructed groups 
(excluding Group 2) were skewed to favour the defence more so that post-instructed groups. 
Ultimately, as concluded in 4.1 above, inconsistent results indicate a lack of power and 
results and interpretation are therefore not reliable. 
4.4 Strengths 
A focus on the manipulated DNA coherence-shift as a dependent measure enables more 
insight into the cognitive process, which previous studies focusing on verdict and probability 
of guilt do not afford (Charman et al., 2016; Glöckner & Engel, 2013). 
In addition, although studies on coherence-shifts have tracked ratings of evidence, they 
have not looked at the impact of ordering effects on coherence-shits, instead changing facts 
(Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Greenspan & Scurich, 2016; Fawcett, 2016). Therefore, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study to simultaneously inspect the cognitive ordering effects on 
coherence-shifting for both the prosecution and the defence. 
The current study has quite good internal validity. Minor changes to the temporal order of 
the same evidence excludes the possibility that the dependent measure is influenced by separate 
inferences caused by changing the strength or content of a piece of evidence as has been done 
in prior studies eliciting coherence-shifting (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Greenspan & Scurich, 
2016; Fawcett, 2016). The current study also avoids potential priming effects, elicited by the 
use of pre-test vignettes. Further, the cognitive process can potentially be generalized to other 
types of prejudicial evidence.  
Finally, the current study enabled the recent assimilation hypothesis (Rassin, 2017) to be 





Pre-trial instructed participants did not read an instruction at the end compared to post-trial 
instructed participants. This resulted in different time delays between second ratings of 
evidence for participants in pre vs. post-instructed conditions. Although Charman et al. (2016) 
found no effect of rumination, memory recall has been proposed as a mediating factor in the 
literature for recency effects (Constabile & Klein, 2010) and pre-trial instruction effectiveness 
(Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). The longer delay for post-trial 
instructed jurors may have reduced memory recall for the defence DNA and this may confound 
the coherence-shift measure.  
Similarly, proximity of the instruction to the DNA evidence may constitute a mediating 
factor for weightings of evidence. This ecological confound arises by the nature of attempting 
to conduct an experiment within the constraints of what is externally applicable in the legal 
institution (i.e. defence presenting case last). Given it applies externally in the legal system it 
is a valid confound. 
The lack of a significant difference on second ratings of evidence could also indicate that 
participants tired of rating the evidence by the end of the trial or alternatively in a 40-minute 
reading time were able to consciously remember their initial ratings. In a courtroom it is likely 
jurors are anchored by their initial impressions of evidence, however, the methodology in the 
current study may pronounce this effect. Therefore, future research should consider including 
a distractor task in between the end of trial materials and the re-rating of evidence, to account 
for this limitation.  
The current study did not account for belief bias. This may account for the inconsistent 
results, and in particular, the high conviction rate in Group 2 (44%) who received a pre-trial 




experimental research on the Story Model, influencing representations constructed (1988, 
1992; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000). Open-ended responses indicated that some 
participants were pro-prosecution. Further, a body of research on the ‘CSI effect’ indicates 
individuals can vary in their prior expectations on forensic evidence depending on exposure to 
forensic evidence in television (Schweitzer & Saks, 2007). 
This study does not account for trial deliberation. Some research indicates groups may 
further polarize facts during the decision-making process (Sunstein, 2000) although several 
studies claim that individual preference for verdict predicts group verdict (Devine, Clayton, 
Dunford, & Seying, 2001). This limits the current study’s external validity. 
Analysis indicated no association between gender and verdict, supporting findings from a 
recent meta-analysis, (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). Despite this, the gender imbalance together 
with the lack of screening for jury eligibility makes the sample bias. Specifically, a large portion 
of participants were students. Although Bornstein et al., (2017) provided support for the use of 
student samples in mock-juror research, Carlson and Russo (2001) did not find the same level 
of predecisional distortion in their student sample compared to prospective jurors, which may 
explain the lack of a significant difference between verdict and total coherence-shift scores. 
Lastly, the online platform excluded individuals without computer access. The above all limit 
the external validity of the study sample. 
Finally, the inconsistencies discussed above indicate the study is does not have the power 
to detect consistent effects between-groups with the current subtle manipulations.  
4.6 Implications for the literature 
The literature has demonstrated proleader and antitrailer distortion (Carlson & Russo, 
2001). Yet the results in the current study do not replicate these findings, indicated by the lack 




voting to convict are more confident (Glöckner & Engel, 2013; Simon 2004). Interestingly, 
proleader and antitrailer distortion (Blanchard, Carlson & Meloy, 2014) has been attributed as 
the cause of increased confidence, yet the current study did not find a significant difference 
between total coherence-shift and verdict. This indicates confidence is more associated with 
reaching the standard of proof.  
Further, the current study failed to replicate the recent assimilation hypothesis (Rassin, 
2017) by finding no inflation of subsequent evidence.  Participants in the current experiment 
were required to evaluate 12 pieces of ambiguous evidence compared to participants in the 
initial experiment (Rassin, 2012) where participants only evaluated four short vignettes which, 
all implicated the defendant. This indicates more power is required in an ecologically valid 
experiment to detect the effect. 
The manipulations in the current experiment may lack the strength required to see an effect. 
For example, participants may have identified the “neighbours’ testimony” (see Appendix E) 
as being ‘obviously’ weak. 
The range of probabilities of guilt associated with each verdict raises questions about the 
use of probability of guilt as a dependent measure in the literature. It indicates probability of 
guilt in place of verdict is not an externally valid measure. The median probability for 
conviction was 80%, aligning with previous findings by Glöckner and Engel (2013). 
Finally, open-ended responses provided support for the Story Model. Participants reported 
inferences not given in the transcript. Examples include; “Mostly relied on the dna evidence 
being on her finger nails and thought she might have grabbed his hair in pain as she begged 
him to stop?” and “…. other ways he could have committed the crime – like borrowing his 
girlfriend’s car or other things like that.” Both of these indicate story construction. One 




conflicting, such as DNA, I find myself relying more heavily on narrative and emotion,” 
indicating a level of self-awareness on reliance on story creation.  
4.7 Implications for the legal system 
Poor comprehension of judicial instruction has been associated with reliance on heuristic 
processing, and racial stereotypes (Lynch & Haney, 2000). Therefore, any improvement on 
jurors’ ability to comprehend and apply instruction is relevant for the legal system. Current 
findings that pre-trial instruction is associated with less fallacious reasoning (specifically, the 
prosecutor’s fallacy) could be included in a report to the Courts Administration Authority 
reviewing current recommendations on appropriate timing of judicial instructions.  
However, despite this the majority of participants still failed to correctly understand the 
DNA evidence, indicating that, contrary to the judgement of Aytugrul v The Queen, judicial 
instruction is not an adequate safeguard. Therefore, the results also contribute to the growing 
support for the prohibition of the exclusion percentage in court.  
4.8 Directions for future research 
Cognitive research on juror decision making is disjointed and uncertain. A systematic 
review would provide valuable direction for future research. Given the unknown effect size, 
future research aiming to replicate the current study should aim for a larger sample size until a 
meta-analysis is viable.  
Extensive research on serial position effects illustrates that both first and last pieces of 
information in a sequence are recalled more easily than those in the middle (Murdock, 1962; 
Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998; de Bruin, 2005). The current study did not 
examine the effect of presenting DNA mid-trial. DNA presented at the beginning and end of 
trial could both be more prejudicial than mid-trial presentation. Such a study examining DNA 
mid-trial would also provide clarity and support for CBR. If mid-trial presentation were found 




throughout the trial. However, if both first and last presentation is associated with increased 
ratings this would provide clarity over whether memory is a mediator of context effects. 
To account for forensic evidence belief bias, future research should consider using the 
FEEBS scale as a pre-assessment measure to analyse prior beliefs as a mediating factor for 
DNA weightings (Smith & Bull, 2012; 2014). Further the measure could assess if pre-trial 
instruction combats prior belief bias over forensic evidence more so than post-trial instruction. 
As the current study indicates belief builds, future research could consider breaking “the story” 
presented by a party by objections, and cross-examination at different time points. Further 
proximity of judicial instruction to DNA may be a mediating factor and future research could 
specifically examine this. 
The literature has focused on predicting verdict with qualitative research, but given the 
open-ended responses discussed in 4.6, future research should consider designing a mixed-
methods or qualitative study. This would add depth to participants’ experience of story 
construction and enable exploration of how pre-trial bias impacts jurors’ decisions. 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
Despite evidentiary thresholds, the courts demand for an impartial juror, capable of 
objectively evaluating incomplete, contradictory and complex evidence appears incompatible 
with an adversarial system where the reliability of forensic evidence is obscure. In light of the 
subtle manipulation in the current study, the large discrepancy in conviction rates across 
conditions supports this. It begs the question; can we expect jurors to remain impartial as 
forensic science continues to evolve beyond the scope of what most laypeople can critically 
evaluate?  
This is particularly relevant in light of the prejudicial nature of DNA evidence, the fallibility 
of human cognitive processes and the grave consequence that a criminal conviction can have 




evidence alone does not have a huge impact on weight attribution by the end of the trial. The 
recency effect and the coherence-shift working in opposite directions seem to mitigate one 
another. The effect of pre-trial instruction is less clear but provides partial support for its 
effectiveness, and perhaps indicates more power is needed achieve consistent results. The 
limitations discussed above make for tentative conclusions, and future research needs to 
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Appendix B – Poster 
 
 
The study: Participation is voluntary. Jurors are comprised of the general population. This 
study aims to investigate the ways in which jurors integrate various pieces of evidence in an 
ambiguous trial. 
Time: The time will depend on your reading speed, but it is estimated this study will take no 
more than 40 minutes. You will be required to read a transcript of a trial and render a verdict. 
Risks: There are no immediate risks to your health of safety in completing this study. It can be 
done on any computer in any place. However, the trial does contain facts about a murder. If 
this is likely to cause any distress to you, we advise you consider not participating in this study. 
Privacy: The data collected in this study will be made available on the Open Science 
Framework, but all of your responses and data will be de-identified. Only the quantitative 
(numerical) aspects of the data will be made available to researchers for future study. You will 
be able to withdraw from the survey at any point in time, however, once you have completed 
the survey your information will be deidentified. Thus, there will be no way to retract your 
results once they have been submitted, as there will be no way to identify your results. 
Human research ethics committee approval number:  
Principle investigator: Dr Carolyn Semmler 
Student researcher: 
Student’s degree: Honours in Psychology 
Participation in this study will mean you can enter the draw to win 1 of 3 $50 David Jones 
vouchers! 
Contact the student researcher below!  
 
 
[Student researcher email tear strips was included at the bottom here *] 
  




Appendix C – Survey link to randomize 
An initial Survey Monkey survey was used to randomize participants to different conditions 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix F – Tests for normality hypothesis 1 
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and Levene’s test for non-parametric data (Nordstokke & Zumbo, 2010) 
Condition  Shapiro-Wilk 
PDNAr1 CSPDNA DDNAr1 CSDDNA 
Group 1 .869, p=.001 .865, p=.001 .916, p=.011 .921, p=.015 
Group 2 .789, p=.000 .802, p=.000 .919, p=.018 .786, p=.000 
Group 3 .842, p=.000 .917, p=.018 .896, p=.005 .827, p=.000 
Group 4 .824, p=.000 .786, p=.000 .902, p=.013 .905, p=.015 
Group 5 .816, p=.000 .872, p=.001 .957, p=.215 .902, p=.006 
Group 6 .834, p=.000 .847, p=.000 .935, p=.061 .964, p=.371 
Group 7 .835, p=.000 .886, p=.003 .899, p=.007 .887, p=.003 
Group 8 .837, p=.000 .776, p=.000 .920, p=.017 .872, p=.001 
Non-parametric Levene’s test F(7,249)=2.309, p=.027 F(7,249)=.763, p=.619 F(7,249)=2.318, p=.026 F(7,249)=1.916, p=.068 
Note. PDNAr1=initial rating of prosecution DNA evidence. DDNAr1=initial rating of defence DNA evidence. CSDDNA=coherence-shift 
defence DNA. CSPDNA=coherence-shift prosecution DNA.  
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Appendix G – Tests for normality Hypothesis 4
 
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance for 
confidence ratings.  
Condition Shapiro-Wilk test 
Group 1 .945, p=.080 
Group 2 .915, p=014 
Group 3 .894, p=.004 
Group 4 .915, p=026 
Group 5 .965, p=.353 
Group 6 .905, p=.010 
Group 7 .912, p=015 
Group 8 .914, p=.011 
Non-parametric Levene’s test F (7,249)=1.443, p=.189 
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Appendix H – Tests for normality for Hypothesis 2
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and non-parametric Levene’s test for testimonies following DNA evidence. 




Group 1 .543, p=.000 .697, p=.000 
Group 2 .641, p=.000 .903, p=.006 
Group 3 .474, p=.000 .837, p=.000 
Group 4 .599, p=.000 .863, p=.002 
Group 5 .742, p=.000 .819, p=.000 
Group 6 .595, p=.000 .742, p=.000 
Group 7 .578, p=.000 .766, p=.000 
Group 8 .713, p=.000 .672, p=.000 
Non-parametric Levene’s test F (7,249) =.609, p=.748 F (7,249) =1.217, p=.294 
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i Also described as inference to the best explanation (Amaya, 2007); with subtractive 
(incoherent items removed), additive (bolstering facts) and reinterprative processes (revising 
evidence) to reach coherence. 
ii Only groups with one change in acronym may be compared (i.e. Group 4 (JI-P2-D1) 
and Group 5 (P1-D1-JI) cannot be compared two things change – the instruction and the 
prosecution evidence). 
iii Comparison = comparison uploaded on the Open Science Framework. 
                                                     
